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State v. Hurst: Does Double Jeopardy Include
a Double Standard?
In the autumn of 1984, a high school student in Fayetteville, North Carolina, threatened a woman with a gun in the parking lot of a shopping center and
eventually sped away in the victim's automobile.I While the entire incident
lasted only a few seconds, the court sentenced the young man to twenty years in
prison. 2 In State v. Hurst3 the North Carolina Supreme Court decided that this
single incident could give rise to convictions for both armed robbery and feloni4
ous larceny, despite the similarity of the crimes and the brevity of the episode.
Though a casual observer may consider the question of law to be theoretical, to
the defendant and others in his position, its resolution could determine the duration of their prison terms.5
This Note examines State v. Hurst to determine whether the supreme court
complied with the defendant's right to be free from double jeopardy, especially
with the protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. After
tracing relevant North Carolina case law and discussing possible weaknesses in
the majority's reasoning, the Note maintains that the supreme court correctly
found that a single incident can support convictions for two separate but similar
statutory offenses. Yet, because the court avoided a deeper inquiry and neglected
to consult criminal statutes in order to pinpoint legislative intent, this analysis
concludes that the supreme court failed to improve sentencing procedures.
The facts in State v. Hurst are not complicated. On October 6, 1984, Ms.
Colleen Shield approached her automobile outside a shopping center in Fayetteville, North Carolina. She locked her pocketbook and two grocery bags in the
trunk of her vehicle. The pocketbook and grocery bags contained personal
property valued at more than 400 dollars. 6 As she was getting into the automobile, defendant Charles Hurst appeared, pointed a gun at Shield, and entered the
vehicle along with her. Shield managed to escape without physical harm, but
Hurst took the car keys from her hand before she fled. Defendant then drove
7
the car away with the articles still in the trunk.
Hurst was tried for robbery with a dangerous weapon and felonious larceny. The jury found defendant guilty on both charges, and the court sentenced
1. State v. Hurst, 82 N.C. App. 1, 3, 346 S.E.2d 8, 9 (1986), rev'd, 320 N.C. 589, 359 S.E.2d
776 (1987).
2. State v. Hurst, 320 N.C. 589, 590, 359 S.E.2d 776, 777 (1987).
3. 320 N.C. 589, 359 S.E.2d 776 (1987).
4. Hurst, 320 N.C. at 590, 359 S.E.2d at 777.
5. By combining the two offenses and by considering aggravating factors, the court in Hurst
imposed a 20 year prison term. Hurst, 82 N.C. App. at 21, 346 S.E.2d at 20. The presumptive
sentence for armed robbery alone, however, is only 14 years. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-87(d) (1986)
("A person convicted of robbery with firearms or other dangerous weapons shall receive a sentence
of at least 14 years in the State's prison.").
6. Hurst, 320 N.C. at 589, 359 S.E.2d at 777.
7. Id. at 589-90, 359 S.E.2d at 777.
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him to twenty years in prison. 8 On appeal defendant argued that he could not
be punished for both felonious larceny and armed robbery based on the facts of
his case. 9 The court of appeals agreed and arrested judgment on the conviction
of felonious larceny. 10 Writing for a unanimous court of appeals, Judge Becton
did not base the decision on the theory that felonious larceny is a lesser included
offense of armed robbery-the court of appeals never reached this issue.1t Instead, Judge Becton reasoned that the trial court violated the defendant's right
to be free from double jeopardy under both the North Carolina and United
States Constitutions12 by punishing him for both armed robbery and felonious
larceny of the same goods from the same person at the same time.13 The court
of appeals concluded that when a case involves only a single taking, the legislature did not intend to punish a defendant for both felonious larceny and armed
robbery. 14
The North Carolina Supreme Court granted discretionary review to determine "whether the defendant in this case may be convicted and sentenced for
both armed robbery and felonious larceny when both charges are based on the
same incident."' 5 To resolve this problem, the supreme court addressed two
questions: first, whether the State can convict a defendant of two separate
crimes based on the same incident; and second, whether felonious larceny is a
crime separate and distinct from armed robbery rather than a lesser included
offense.
Justice Webb wrote for the majority. In resolving the first issue, he conceded that language from a previous North Carolina Supreme Court opinion
indicated that according to double jeopardy principles, the state could not punish a defendant for two similar statutory offenses when the offenses arise from a
single incident. 16 Yet, the court dismissed this earlier language as an incorrect
8. Id. at 590, 359 S.E.2d at 777.
9. In addition to requesting the court of appeals to arrest judgment on the felonious larceny
conviction, defendant presented nine other instances of error by the trial court. Hurst, 82 N.C. App.
at 4, 346 S.E.2d at 10.
10. Id. at 20, 346 S.E.2d at 19.
11. Id. at 10, 346 S.E.2d at 13-14.
12. The constitutions of both North Carolina and the United States prohibit double jeopardy.
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that rio person shall be "subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. In Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), the Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy prohibition
applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 794.
Independent of the federal constitution, the North Carolina Constitution guarantees that "[n]o
person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or
exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land." N.C.
CONSr. art. I, § 19. Although the North Carolina Constitution does not expressly grant the right to
be free from double jeopardy, the state supreme court has interpreted this section to include such a
right. In State v. Crocker, 239 N.C. 446, 80 S.E.2d 243 (1954), the court stated that "[it is a
fundamental and sacred principle of the common law.., that no person can be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb for the same offense .... While the principle is not stated in express terms in the
North Carolina Constitution, it has been regarded as an integral part of the 'law of the land'...
Id. at 449, 80 S.E.2d at 245.
13. Hurst, 82 N.C. App. at 10-20, 346 S.E.2d at 13-19.
14. Id. at 20, 346 S.E.2d at 19.
15. Hurst, 320 N.C. at 590, 359 S.E.2d at 777.
16. Id. at 590-91, 359 S.E.2d at 777. The previous North Carolina case to which Justice Webb
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statement of the law. 17 Instead, the majority cited several North Carolina cases

in which a defendant was punished for more than one similar statutory crime

based on only one transaction.' 8 The court therefore concluded that as long as
the offenses were legally separate, the State could punish a defendant for more
than one similar statutory crime, even though the case involved just one transac-

tion and one investigation. 19
Having established that defendant was susceptible to punishment for two
separate crimes based on a single transaction, the court had to determine
whether this case even involved two separate offenses. Thus, the opinion turned
to the second issue, whether felonious larceny is a lesser included offense of
armed robbery or a crime separate and distinct from armed robbery. After recognizing a conflict between two lines of North Carolina cases,20 the court restated the applicable doctrine: "[a]n offense is a lesser included offense when all
its essential elements are included in the greater offense and proof of all elements
in the greater offense will prove all elements of the lesser offense." 2 1 If an offense contains any essential element which the greater offense does not share,

then the offenses are legally distinct.
Under this test felonious larceny and armed robbery are separate and dis-

tinct crimes for two reasons. First, larceny requires the taking and carrying
away of the property of another.22 On the other hand, an attempted taking
referred is State v. McGill, 296 N.C. 564, 251 S.E.2d 616 (1979). The pertinent language stated that
"[m]ultiple punishment is one facet of the prohibition against double jeopardy. That rule applies
'[w]here two or more offenses of the same nature are by statute carved out of the same transaction
and are properly the subject of a single investigation.'" McGill, 296 N.C. at 568, 251 S.E.2d at 619
(citations omitted). The Hurst majority admitted that "if the language in McGill is the law, a defendant may not be punished for more than one offense if two or more offenses created by statute
arise from one transaction ...." Hurst, 320 N.C. at 591, 359 S.E.2d at 777.
For a discussion of McGill, see infra text accompanying notes 3845.
17. Hurst, 320 N.C. at 591, 359 S.E.2d at 777.
18. Id. The cases cited by the majority were State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 340 S.E.2d 701
(1986), State v. Murray, 310 N.C. 541, 313 S.E.2d 523 (1984), and State v. Revelle, 301 N.C. 153,
270 S.E.2d 476 (1980). For discussions of these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 46-52, 5877.
19. Hurst, 320 N.C. at 591, 359 S.E.2d at 777.
20. Several cases indicate that larceny is a lesser included offense of armed robbery. State v.
Owens, 277 N.C. 697, 702, 178 S.E.2d 442, 445 (1971) (larceny from the person and simple larceny
listed as examples of a lesser included offense of robbery with firearms); State v. Swaney, 277 N.C.
602, 612, 178 S.E.2d 399, 405, cerL denied, 402 U.S. 1006 (1971) ("An indictment for robbery with
firearms will support a conviction of the lesser included offenses of... larceny from the person, or
simple larceny."); State v. Hatcher, 277 N.C. 380, 390, 177 S.E.2d 892, 899 (1970) (larceny from the
person and simple larceny listed as examples of a lesser included offense of robbery with firearms);
State v. Parker, 262 N.C. 679, 684, 138 S.E.2d 496, 500 (1964) (same); State v. Wenrich, 251 N.C.
460, 460, 111 S.E.2d 582, 582-83 (1959) (per curiam) (same); State v. Davis, 242 N.C. 476, 478, 87
S.E.2d 906, 908 (1955) (same); State v. Bell, 228 N.C. 659, 663, 46 S.E.2d 834, 837 (1948) (same).
Recent cases, however, hold that the crimes are legally separate offenses. State v. Murray, 310
N.C. 541, 548-49, 313 S.E.2d 523, 529 (1984) (armed robbery and larceny are separate offenses);
State v. Beaty, 306 N.C. 491, 501, 293 S.E.2d 760, 767 (1982) (same); State v. Revelle, 301 N.C. 153,
163, 270 S.E.2d 476, 481-82 (1980) (felonious larceny, armed robbery, burglary, and rape are legally
separate and distinct crimes).
21. Hurst, 320 N.C. at 592, 359 S.E.2d at 778; see also State v. Weaver, 306 N.C. 629, 635, 295
S.E.2d 375, 379 (1982) ("[A]ll of the essential elements of the lesser crime must also be essential
elements included in the greater crime. If the lesser crime has an essential element which is not
completely covered by the greater crime, it is not a lesser included offense.").
22. Hurst, 320 N.C. at 592, 359 S.E.2d at 778. The essential elements of larceny are satisfied
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would satisfy the definition of armed robbery. 23 Second, the felonious larceny in
this case was based on the goods having a value over 400 dollars. 24 Armed

robbery, however, has no monetary threshhold. 25 Thus, satisfaction of the
armed robbery elements would not necessarily satisfy the elements of felonious
larceny. 26 bue to these differences in elements, the supreme court held that
felonious larceny was not a lesser included offense of armed robbery, but was
instead a separate and distinct offense. 27 Because State v. Hurst involved two
separate crimes, and because a defendant could be punished for two crimes

based on one incident, convicting Hurst of both armed robbery and felonious
larceny was not an error. The supreme court therefore reversed the court of

appeals and remanded the case for an order affirming the judgment of the trial
8
2

court.

Justice Frye authored a dissent in which Chief Justice Exum joined. 29 Frye
was not opposed to the holding that felonious larceny and armed robbery were
separate crimes,30 but he clearly disagreed with the preliminary finding that this
single incident could give rise to convictions for both felonious larceny and
armed robbery. According to Frye, it was not important that the majority found
armed robbery and larceny to be distinct crimes. Even if they were separate
when a defendant (1) takes the property of another; (2) carries the property away; (3) without the
owner's consent; and (4) with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property. Id. In
addition, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72 (1986), makes larceny a felony if (a) the property has a value
greater than $400; (b) the property is any explosive or incendiary device or substance; (c) the property is a firearm; (d) the property is any record or paper in the custody of the North Carolina
Archives; (e) the larceny is from the person; or (f) the larceny is committed pursuant to a burglary
or breaking and entering.
23. Hurst, 320 N.C. at 592, 359 S.E.2d at 778. The statutory elements constituting armed
robbery include (1) the unlawful taking or an attempt to take personal property from the person or
in the presence of another; (2) by use or threatened use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon,
implement, or means; (3) whereby the life of a person is endangered or threatened. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-87 (1986).
24. Hurst, 320 N.C. at 593, 359 S.E.2d at 778.
25. Id. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-87 (1986) (no language establishing any requirement that
the stolen property have a certain value).
26. Hurst, 320 N.C. at 592-93, 359 S.E.2d at 778. If the felonious larceny was based on one of
the other premises listed in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72(b), such as larceny of an explosive device,
satisfaction of the armed robbery elements would indeed satisfy the felonious larceny elements.
Thus, only when the larceny is based on the value of the goods being greater than $400 is the second
distinction between armed robbery and felonious larceny valid.
27. Hurst, 320 N.C. at 593, 359 S.E.2d at 778. At first glance, the holding may seem unfair
because it is based on definitional differences rather than on the facts of the case. In other words,
defendant's behavior in this particular case was more than a mere attempt, and the stolen property
exceeded $400 in value. In this specific instance, satisfaction of the robbery elements also satisfied
the felonious larceny elements.
Yet, the North Carolina Supreme Court has already expressed its disagreement with this criticism. In State v. Weaver, 306 N.C. 629, 295 S.E.2d 375 (1982), the court "[did] not agree with the
proposition that the facts of a particular case should determine whether one crime is a lesser included offense of another. Rather, the definitions accorded the crimes determine whether one offense
is a lesser included offense of another crime.... The determination is made on a definitional,not a
factual basis." Id. at 635, 295 S.E.2d at 378-79.
28. Hurst, 320 N.C. at 593, 359 S.E.2d at 779.
29. Id. at 593-96, 359 S.E.2d at 779-80.
30. Justice Frye conceded that the cases relied upon by the majority supported this conclusion.
Id. at 595, 359 S.E.2d at 780 ("the three cases relied on by the majority support the holding that
felonious larceny is not always a lesser included offense of armed robbery ....
).
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offenses, Frye agreed with the court of appeals that the legislature did not intend
for the State to punish a defendant for both robbery and larceny based on a
31
single taking from one victim at one time.
The importance of State v. Hurst, is not the finding that felonious larceny is
a separate crime from armed robbery rather than a lesser included offense. This
holding is only a minor development over which the majority and dissent did
not vigorously argue. 32 What is noteworthy and disputed about Hurst is the
larger development-the opinion's initial determination that a single incident
can support punishment for two very similar offenses, as long as the crimes are
legally separate and distinct. A survey of the precedent leading up to the Hurst
opinion will clarify the majority position and aid in understanding the merits of
the dissenting opinion.
Before discussing North Carolina case law, however, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of double jeopardy principles. 33 The right to be free from
double jeopardy, flowing from both the United States and North Carolina Constitutions, 34 guarantees that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . ,,a3 This clause generally prohibits
(1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for
the same offense.3 6 Under the third protection, at issue in Hurst, "[t]he test is
not whether the defendant has already been tried for the same act, but whether
he has been put in jeopardy for the same offense."' 37 These general statements
indicate that the State cannot impose two punishments for the same offense, but
the development of a workable concept of "same offense" has been problematic.
State v. McGill,3 8 decided in 1979, was the source of the language cited by
the court of appeals but dismissed by the supreme court in Hurst. In McGill
defendant was charged with possession of more than one ounce of marijuana
and with possession with intent to sell or deliver marijuana. 39 Defendant contended that possession of more than one ounce was a lesser included offense of
possession with intent to sell. He also claimed that he would be prejudiced unless the court required the State to choose one of the two offenses upon which to
proceed. 4° The supreme court disagreed. Applying the traditional test of com31. Id. at 595-96, 359 S.E.2d at 780 (Frye, J., dissenting).
32. For a discussion of this issue written prior to the supreme court decision in Hurst and
calling for legislative amendment of the armed robbery statute, see Braun, Lesser Included Offenses:

A New Piece in the Puzzle, 8 Campbell Law Observer, Jun. 26, 1987, at 1.
33. For a discussion of double jeopardy principles, see M. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY
(1969); J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY

(1969).
34. See supra note 12.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

36. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 451,
340 S.E.2d 701, 707 (1986).
37. State v. Barefoot, 241 N.C. 650, 654-55, 86 S.E.2d 424, 427 (1955).
38. 296 N.C. 564, 251 S.E.2d 616 (1979).
39. McGill, 296 N.C. at 565, 251 S.E.2d at 617.
40. Id. at 567, 251 S.E.2d at 618-19. Defendant argued that in lesser included offense cases,
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paring essential elements, 4 1 the court determined that the two crimes each contained one element which was not necessary for proof of the other; thus,
possession of more than one ounce of marijuana was not a lesser included offense
of possession with intent to sell or deliver marijuana.4 2 Furthermore, the court
did not require the prosecution to elect one theory, but instead held that the
State could proceed on both theories alternatively. 43 The McGill court, however, was very careful to qualify its holding:
[The holding does] not mean, however, that a defendant [can] be punished for both offenses because of possession of the same contraband.
Multiple punishment is one facet of the prohibition against double
jeopardy. That rule applies "[w]here two or more offenses of the same
nature are by statute carved out of the same transaction and are properly the subject of a single investigation."' 44
This language indicated that although a defendant could be prosecuted for two
offenses of the same nature, he could only be convicted of one offense if two
similar crimes arose from the same transaction. Testimony to this principle was
the fact that the McGill court directed the jury to consider possession of more
than one ounce of marijuana if and only if they found the defendant not guilty of
45
possession with intent to sell.
Just one year later, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court ignored
this principle and upheld multiple convictions for similar crimes based on the
same series of events. In State v. Revelle 4 6 defendant broke into the victims'
mobile home, robbed the victims at gunpoint, raped their neighbor, and escaped
in the victims' automobile. 47 Defendant was tried and convicted of felonious
larceny, armed robbery, burglary, and rape. 48 He argued that the trial court
violated his right to be free from double jeopardy by convicting him of four
felonies based on the same series of events. 49 The supreme court found no error.
The court offered two justifications for its decision. First, the court segmented
the episode and found that each offense represented a separate action by the
unless the State was required to choose one offense upon which to proceed, the jury would hear
multiple charges against him and infer "greater criminal activity than actually exist[ed]." Id.
41. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), is credited with the development of the

traditional test. The Supreme Court established that "the test to be applied to determine whether
there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other

does not." Id. at 304.
The elements comparison has long been followed in North Carolina as well. See, e.g., State v.
Birckhead, 256 N.C. 494, 500, 124 S.E.2d 838, 843-44 (1962) ("[I]feach statute requires proof of an

additional fact not required by the other, the offenses are not the same.").
42. Possession of over an ounce of marijuana required, of course, a showing that the amount in
question was greater than one ounce. The elements of possession with intent to sell or deliver, on the

other hand, could be satisfied with any amount of marijuana. The elements failed to match. McGill,
296 N.C. at 568, 251 S.E.2d at 619.
43. Id.

44. Id. (quoting State v. Midgett, 214 N.C. 107, 110, 198 S.E. 613, 614 (1938) (citations
omitted)).
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

McGill, 296 N.C. at 569, 251 S.E.2d at 619-20.
301 N.C. 153, 270 S.E.2d 476 (1980).
Revelle, 301 N.C. at 155-56, 270 S.E.2d at 478.
Id. at 156, 270 S.E.2d at 478.
Id. at 162, 270 S.E.2d at 481.
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50
defendant despite all four charges being based on the same series of events.
Second, the court found that felonious larceny, armed robbery, burglary, and
rape were legally distinct crimes; no one of them was a lesser included offense of
the other.5 1 Thus, as long as the evidence supported separate offenses, convicting defendant of four distinct crimes did not place him in double jeopardy, even
though the case involved a single series of events and even though three of the
four crimes were similar in nature.5 2 Revelle, therefore, deviated from the McGill language and proceeded on a different theory: multiple punishment does
not violate double jeopardy protection when the evidence supports two or more
separate offenses with independent elements; double jeopardy is violated only
when the evidence presented on more than one charge is identical.
State v. Beaty,5 3 decided in 1982, presented the supreme court with a previously unanswered question-whether freedom from double jeopardy is violated
when the state charges a defendant with two counts of armed robbery for assaulting only one employee but taking property both from the employee and
from the business. 54 The court stated that the existence of a single assault was
the controlling factor and that the ownership of the stolen property was not
significant.55 Because the facts and elements alleged in each indictment were the
same, the supreme court held that defendant could be convicted of armed rob56
bery of either the employee or the business, but not both.

The Beaty opinion concluded with dictum which followed the Revelle rationale and directly influenced the result in Hurst. The dictum concerned a combination of charges which the prosecution chose not to pursue. After listing the
essential elements of both armed robbery and larceny, the court maintained that
"[a]rmed robbery and larceny are separate crimes .... defendant here could have
been convicted of one count of armed robbery and one count of larceny, had he
been so charged ....,,57 Because Beaty involved only one incident, the court's
observation lent support to the theories that armed robbery and felonious larceny are separate offenses, and freedom from double jeopardy is not violated if
the factual setting supports two separate and distinct crimes, regardless of the
number of incidents and the similarity of the crimes.
Two years later, the North Carolina Supreme Court went beyond dictum
50. Id. at 163, 270 S.E.2d at 482 (burglary when defendant entered the mobile home; armed
robbery when defendant took property from the victims at gunpoint; rape after the armed robbery;
and larceny when defendant took the victims' automobile).
51. The Revelle court created some confusion by stating both a legal and a factual justification
for its holding. According to one interpretation, Revelle was decided not because one incident could
give rise to two similar offenses, but because the case actually involved multiple incidents. See State
v. Hurst, 320 N.C. 589, 594, 359 S.E.2d 776, 779 (1987) (Frye, J., dissenting) ("the two offenses...
represented separate actions by defendant although all the charges were based on the same series of
events .... [Tlhere were two separate takings in Revelle ... .
52. Revelle, 301 N.C. at 163, 270 S.E.2d at 482.
53. 306 N.C. 491, 293 S.E.2d 760 (1982).
54. Beaty, 306 N.C. at 499, 293 S.E.2d at 765-66.
55. Id. at 499, 293 S.E.2d at 766.
56. Id. at 500, 293 S.E.2d at 766.
57. Id. at 501, 293 S.E.2d at 767.
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and relied directly upon Revelle when deciding State v. Murray.5 8 In Murray
the State's evidence showed that defendant, along with other men, beat and
robbed a warehouse owner as he was leaving his place of employment. Defendant and the other men then drove away in the victim's automobile.5 9 The victim died the following morning and a jury found defendant guilty of first degree
murder, armed robbery, and felonious larceny of an automobile. 60 Defendant
argued that his convictions for both armed robbery and felonious larceny violated his right to be free from double jeopardy. 6 1 Citing State v. Revelle, the
court maintained that "even where evidence to support two or more offenses
overlaps, double jeopardy does not occur unless the evidence required to support
the two convictions is identical."'62 The court then listed the elements of armed
robbery and larceny and concluded that at least one essential element of each
crime was not an element of the other.6 3 Because the case involved separate
offenses with different essential elements, defendant was not a victim of double
jeopardy when the court punished him for both armed robbery and felonious
larceny. 64 The court did not find the similarity of the crimes to be important.
Thus, the supreme court apparently adhered to a consistent theory in Revelle,
Beaty, and Murray, and completely neglected to give any recognition to the language in McGill.65
Finally, State v. Gardner66 is vital to a thorough understanding of State v.
Hurst. In Gardner,a 1986 case, the issue was whether the State violated defendant's right to be free from double jeopardy by punishing him for breaking and
entering and for felony larceny pursuant to that breaking and entering. 67 Because Gardner dealt with a greater and lesser included offense, the Hurst court
found that it had no application to cases involving separate offenses. 68 Nevertheless, the analytical method introduced in Gardner contained additional inquiries which could have been extremely influential if the court had applied the
69
same method in Hurst.
In Gardner the North Carolina Supreme Court borrowed the approach formulated by the United States Supreme Court in Missouriv. Hunter.70 First, the
58. 310 N.C. 541, 313 S.E.2d 523 (1984).
59. Murray, 310 N.C. at 544, 313 S.E.2d at 526.
60. Id. at 542-43, 313 S.E.2d at 526.
61. Id. at 543, 313 S.E.2d at 526.
62. Id. at 548, 313 S.E.2d at 529.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. The consistent theory followed in Revelle, Beaty, and Murray is that one incident or transaction can give rise to two similar statutory offenses without violating double jeopardy protection, as
long as those offenses are legally distinct crimes. Revelle, 301 N.C. at 163, 270 S.E.2d at 481-82.
66. 315 N.C. 444, 340 S.E.2d 701 (1986).
67. Gardner,315 N.C. at 451, 340 S.E.2d at 707.
68. Hurst, 320 N.C. at 591, 359 S.E.2d at 778. The court stated, "If felonious larceny is not a
lesser included offense of armed robbery... Gardnerhas no application." The court subsequently
held that felonious larceny was not a lesser included offense of armed robbery. Id. at 593, 359 S.E.2d
778-79.
69. This Note concludes by criticizing the majority for failing to apply the Gardnermethod in
Hurst. See infra text accompanying notes 110-28.
70. 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
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Gardner court recognized that breaking and entering was the predicate crime
upon which the State charged defendant with felony larceny pursuant to breaking and entering.7 1 Traditional analysis would have stopped the inquiry at this
point; because the case did not involve two distinct crimes, double jeopardy
would allow only one conviction. 72 Yet, the court declared that the traditional
test was no longer conclusive; it merely raised a presumption that only a single
punishment is appropriate. 73 The North Carolina Supreme Court then mimicked federal constitutional law by deciding that a clear indication of legislative
74
intent could rebut the presumption:

71. Gardner,315 N.C. at 455, 340 S.E.2d at 709.
72. The United States Supreme Court developed the traditional analysis in Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). The issue in Blockburger was whether the accused committed
two offenses or one offense when his single act violated two sections of the Harrison Anti-Narcotic
Act. The Court established what would commonly become known as the Blockburger test:
The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two
offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does
not.
Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. The Court in Blockburger applied the test and concluded that the
single act gave rise to two offenses. Id.
The Blockburger Court was not the first tribunal to establish this test. The Court cited Gavieres
v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911), which in turn had adopted language from the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts in Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433 (1871).
Under the Blockburger test, the analysis was straightforward. If comparison of the elements
resulted in two separate offenses, multiple conviction was allowed. On the other hand, if the test
indicated the same offense, double jeopardy prohibited cumulative punishment.
For years, North Carolina followed an approach similar to the Blockburger test. See, eg., State
v. Birckhead, 256 N.C. 494, 500, 124 S.E.2d 838, 843 (1962) (the "additional facts test"); but for a
discussion of the several variations on this approach in North Carolina, see Comment, CriminalLaw
- Multiple Punishment and the Same Evidence Rule, 8 WAKE FORsT L. REv. 243, 246-58 (1972).
73. The United States Supreme Court's first indication that the Blockburger test was not an
absolute component of double jeopardy analysis came in Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684
(1980):
The assumption underlying the [Blockburger] rule is that Congress ordinarily does not
intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes. Accordingly, where two
statutory provisions proscribe the "same offense," they are construed not to authorize cumulative punishment in the absence of a clear indicationof contrary legislative intent.
Id. at 691-92 (emphasis added). The Whalen Court nevertheless interpreted the legislative history in
that particular case to require strict compliance with the result reached under the Blockburger test.
Id. at 692.
In Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981), the Court applied the Blockburger test and
found that the case involved separate statutory offenses. Id. at 339. Yet, instead of routinely assuming that multiple sentences were permissible, the Court stated that "[tihe Blockburger test ... should
not be controlling where, for example, there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent." Id.
at 340. Again, however, the Court found nothing in the legislative history mandating a different
outcome from the result reached by application of the Blockburger test.
Finally, in Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983), the Court conclusively held:
[when] a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes, regardless of whether those two statutes proscribe the "same" conduct under Blockburger, a
court's task of statutory construction is at an end and the prosecutor may seek and the trial
court or jury may impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial.
Id. at 368-69. In Hunter, because "the Missouri Legislature made its intent crystal clear," defendant
was susceptible to punishment for first degree robbery and for armed criminal action even though
the statutes proscribed the same conduct under the Blockburger rule. Id. at 368.
74. In Gardner the North Carolina Supreme Court abandoned strict compliance with the elements comparison and adhered to the Hunter approach. Gardner, 315 N.C. at 453, 340 S.E.2d at
708. Rather than simply comparing the essential elements of the statutory offenses, the court sur-
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Even if the elements of the two statutory crimes are identical and
neither requires proof of a fact that the other does not, the defendant
may, in a single trial, be convicted of and punished for both crimes if it
is found that the legislature so intended. 7"
As a result of the change in doctrine, the court analyzed legislation to determine
if the State could punish defendant for two offenses even though one crime was a
lesser included offense of the other. After examining legislative intent and finding that the North Carolina General Assembly intended such a result, 76 the
Gardnercourt concluded that punishing the defendant separately for the lesser
offense, breaking and entering, and for the greater offense, felony larceny, did
77
not violate double jeopardy protections.
Under normal procedure, North Carolina courts compare the essential elements of the potential offenses. If the comparison points to legally separate offenses, the defendant is susceptible to cumulative punishment regardless of the
number of transactions or the similarity of the crimes. According to Gardner,
when the comparison reveals a greater and lesser included offense, the courts
also check legislative intent for an indication that mutilple punishment is nevertheless permissible. Yet, the preceding survey of principle and case law reveals
two areas of tension. The first conflict is between the language in McGill and the
decisions in subsequent cases which failed to adhere to this language; the issue is
whether the Hurst court should have followed McGill instead of the later cases.
The second conflict is between the analytical method adopted in Gardner and
the approach followed in Hurst. The remainder of this Note will examine these
79
two conflicts, addressing first the McGill issue78 and second the Gardnerissue.
veyed legislative intent to determine if multiple punishment was appropriate. Id. at 453-54, 340
S.E.2d at 708.
The underlying reason for this expanded approach hinged on the difference between the two
types of double jeopardy protection. In successive-prosecution situations, double jeopardy relieves
the defendant of the constant anxiety and worry over whether he will have to endure a second trial
for the same conduct. In single-prosecution situations involving multiple punishment, on the other
hand, the defendant's interests and the analyses are different:
Different interests are involved when the issue is purely one of multiple punishments, without the complications of a successive prosecution ....The only interest of the defendant is
in not having more punishment imposed than that intended by the Legislature. The intent
of the Legislature, therefore, is determinative.
Id. at 452, 340 S.E.2d at 707 (quoting People v. Robideau, 419 Mich. 458, 484-85, 355 N.W.2d 592,
603, reh'g denied, 420 Mich. 1201, 362 N.W.2d 219 (1984)). Thus, in single trial settings, the courts
violate double jeopardy if they impose more punishment that the legislature intended. See also M.
FRIEDLAND, supra note 33, at 199 (the rule against multiple convictions in a single trial is "more a
matter of sentencing policy and of discovering the intent of the legislature than of protecting the
accused from unwarranted harassment."); J.SIGLER, supra note 33, at 64 ("Every new criminal
statute . . .[increases] the number of possible convictions and sentences which a defendant may
suffer .... It must be determined whether the legislature 'intended' to increase the penalty for a
single criminal deed.").
For a discussion and criticism of North Carolina's adoption of the Hunter approach, see Note,
State v. Gardner: North CarolinaSails into the SargassoSea, 65 N.C.L. REV. 1267 (1987).
75. Gardner,315 N.C. at 455, 340 S.E.2d at 709.
76. Id. at 460-63, 340 S.E.2d at 712-13 (the court examined such factors as the number of social
norms violated, the placement of the offenses in separate articles within the statute, judicial history,
and legislative acquiescence).
77. Id. at 463, 340 S.E.2d at 714.
78. The "McGill issue" is simply a label describing this Note's analysis of whether a single
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The Hurst decision was not revolutionary in permitting punishment for
more than one similar crime based on a single incident. Revelle allowed convictions for felonious larceny, armed robbery, and burglary based on the same series of events. 80 Murray allowed convictions for armed robbery and felonious
larceny flowing from one incident. 81 Gardnereven allowed punishment for both
an offense and its lesser included offense. 82 Thus, the Hurst court was quite
consistent in allowing convictions for both armed robbery and felonious larceny
based on one incident.
These cases, however, are inconsistent with the language in McGill. McGill, articulated at least one year before any of these decisions, 83 stated that two
84
offenses of the same nature could not be carved out of a single transaction.
This apparent inconsistency can be resolved by one of two competing interpretations. The first theory maintains that McGill is a sound statement of the law and
that the subsequent cases contained clear factual distinctions which warranted a
deviation from McGill. According to this view, the Hurst court should have
followed the McGill language and allowed only one conviction since Hurst did
not contain such factual distinctions.85 The second theory, followed by the majority, is that McGill contained incorrect and unnecessary verbiage; that the subsequent cases represent the law; and that the factual setting in Hurst is similar
86
enough to these subsequent cases to require the same result.
Under the first theory, advocated by the dissenting opinion in Hurst, two
87
crimes of the same nature cannot arise from a single incident or transaction,
and each of the cases subsequent to McGill justifiably deviated from this principle. First, Revelle is distinguishable because each stage in the series of events
can be viewed as a separate incident. Rather than a single event supporting
multiple punishments, Revelle was a case of several events giving rise to several
convictions. 8 The court even stated that "[e]ach offense represent[ed] a separate
action by defendant, although all the charges were based on the same series of
events." 89 Second, Murray can be differentiated in similar fashion. There, the
incident can give rise to convictions for two similar offenses without violating double jeopardy protections. See infra text accompanying notes 80-106.
79. The "Gardner issue" is a label describing this Note's discussion of whether the Hurst court
(separate offense) should have followed the analysis used in Gardner(a lesser included offense and a
greater offense). See infra text accompanying notes 110-28.

80. State v. Revelle, 301 N.C. 153, 270 S.E.2d 476 (1980); see supra text accompanying notes
46-52.
81. State v. Murray, 310 N.C. 541, 313 S.E.2d 523 (1984); see supra text accompanying notes

58-65.

82. State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 340 S.E.2d 701 (1986); see supratext accompanying notes

66-77.
83. McGill was a 1979 case. The opinion closest in time to McGill was Revelle, 301 N.C. 153,
270 S.E.2d 476, decided in 1980.
84. McGill, 296 N.C. at 568, 251 S.E.2d at 619.
85. See Hurst, 320 N.C. at 594-95, 359 S.E.2d at 779-80 (Frye, J., dissenting) (distinguishing
the subsequent cases and arguing that the court of appeals decided correctly).
86. Hurst, 320 N.C. at 591, 359 S.E.2d at 777.
87. McGill, 296 N.C. at 568, 251 S.E.2d at 619.
88. Hurst, 320 N.C. at 594, 359 S.E.2d at 779 (Frye, J.,
dissenting); see supra note 50.
89. Revelle, 301 N.C. at 163, 270 S.E.2d at 482.
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armed robbery of the victim can be seen as a separate action from the larceny of

the victim's automobile. Again, although the crimes are quite similar, they arise
from two separate incidents, not one.90 Third, Beaty is distinguishable as well.

two
Not only did the court allow only one conviction, 9 1 but the case involved
92

counts of the same crime rather than two separately classified crimes.

Hurst, conversely, is not distinguishable. The case involved the precise circumstances contemplated by the McGill language: the State attempted to use
one transaction to convict a defendant of armed robbery and larceny, two statu-

tory offenses of the same nature. 93 Thus, if McGill is a correct statement of the
law, Revelle, Murray, and Beaty can each be considered factual or legal excep-

tions to the general rule. Hurst can be criticized for ignoring McGill and following the subsequent cases when the factual setting did not justify such a deviation.
For several reasons, however, the preceding criticism of Hurst is unsound.
The majority reflected the second theory, finding the McGill language to be an
incorrect statement of the law and the subsequent cases to embody accepted
double jeopardy principles. 94 Close analysis shows that the majority, instead of

clinging to the McGill verbiage, adhered to a more accurate interpretation of
double jeopardy and presented a method less tedious and burdensome than McGill would require.

In addition to being dictum, 95 the McGill language cannot form the basis
of a valid criticism because it is not completely accurate in describing double
jeopardy principles. According to McGill, freedom from double jeopardy protects a defendant from the use of one transaction to support punishment for two

statutory offenses of the same nature.96 Yet, double jeopardy shields a defendant
from multiple penalties for the same offense. 97 In single trial settings, this guarantee means that a court can impose only that amount of punishment which the
legislature prescribed. 98 On numerous occasions, the supreme court has fulfilled

this obligation by finding that multiple punishment is permissible as long as the
facts support legally separate offenses as defined by the legislature. 99 Neither the
90. Hurst, 320 N.C. at 595, 359 S.E.2d at 780 (Frye, J., dissenting).
91. Beaty, 306 N.C. at 500, 293 S.E.2d at 766.
92. Beaty, 306 N.C. 491, 293 S.E.2d 760 (1982) (two counts of armed robbery); see also Hurst,
320 N.C. at 595, 359 S.E.2d at 780 (Frye, 3., dissenting) ("Beaty does not control the instant case
because Beaty involved only indictments charging armed robbery.").
93. The one transaction was the incident in the parking lot in Fayetteville, North Carolina. See
supra text accompanying notes 6-7. The two separate statutory offenses of the same nature were
armed robbery and felonious larceny. Hurst, 320 N.C. at 589, 359 S.E.2d at 777.
94. Id. at 591, 359 S.E.2d at 777.
95. Id. ("The quoted language was not necessary to a decision in the case."). The actual holding in McGill was that the State did not have to choose one theory, but could instead proceed under
two statutes. McGill, 296 N.C. at 568, 251 S.E.2d at 619.
96. McGill, 296 N.C. at 568, 251 S.E.2d at 619.
97. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 451,
340 S.E.2d 701, 707 (1986); see also U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("subject for the same offense").
98. Gardner, 315 N.C. at 452, 340 S.E.2d at 707 ("The Double Jeopardy Clauses of both the
United States and North Carolina Constitutions prohibit a court from imposing more punishment
than that intended by the legislature."); see supra note 74.
99. See, eg., State v. Murray, 310 N.C. 541, 313 S.E.2d 523 (1984) (murder, armed robbery,
and felonious larceny); State v. Revelle, 301 N.C. 153, 270 S.E.2d 476 (1980) (felonious larceny,
armed robbery, burglary, and rape); State v. Harrington, 283 N.C. 527, 196 S.E.2d 742 (possession
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singularity of the incident nor the similarity of the statutory offenses appears to
be important. 10 The case must involve multiple penalties for the exact same
offense or a lesser included offense before double jeopardy will intervene. 10 1
The court in McGill reached back to State v. Midgett,102 a 1938 case, for its
theory.10 3 Midgett specifically stated, however, that "when the same facts constitute two or more offenses ... the first prosecution will not be a bar to the
second, although the offenses were both committed at the same time and by the

same act.' 1°4 Thus, the majority's analysis more closely adhered to established
double jeopardy doctrine. The dissent's theory is not as sound. The supreme
court was wise to alleviate any confusion by discrediting the McGill language
and holding that one transaction can give rise to punishment for two similar

statutory offenses.
The criticism also fails by relying on detailed factual distinctions. The dis-

sent complains that since Revelle and Murray involved multiple takings, multiple convictions were warranted; because Hurst involved just one taking, only one

conviction is justified.105 The prosecutor in Hurst, however, could have manipulated the facts to form two transactions as well. The initial struggle during
which defendant obtained the victim's car keys could be considered armed robbery or attempted armed robbery; the driving away could be considered the felonious larceny.1 0 6 Thus, formulating a doctrine upon the number of transactions
and transportation of narcotics), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1011 (1973); State v. Thornton, 283 N.C. 513,
196 S.E.2d 701 (1973) (possession and distribution of heroin); State v. Cameron, 283 N.C. 191, 195
S.E.2d 481 (1973) (possession and sale of heroin).
100. The general rule in North Carolina is as follows:
[t]he plea of former jeopardy, to be good, must be grounded on the "same offense," both in
law and in fact, and it is not sufficient that the two offenses grew out of the same

transaction.
4 STRONG's NORTH CAROLINA INDEX, Criminal Law § 26.3 (3d ed. 1976) (footnotes omitted). See
also State v. Cameron, 283 N.C. 191, 198, 195 S.E.2d 481, 486 (1973) (recognizing the Strong's
language as the "basic rule in North Carolina").
For additional cases supporting the general rule that a single incident can give rise to multiple
offenses, even though the offenses are very similar, see State v. Kornegay, 313 N.C. 1, 326 S.E.2d 881
(1985) (embezzlement and malfeasance of a corporate agent); State v. Thrift, 78 N.C. App. 199, 336
S.E.2d 861 (1985) (trafficking by possession and trafficking by delivery); State v. Lewis, 32 N.C. App.
298, 231 S.E.2d 693 (1977) (possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and delivery of
the same controlled substance); see also supra note 99.
101. State v. Murray, 310 N.C. 541,547, 313 S.E.2d 523, 528 (1984) ("A person's right to be free
from double jeopardy is violated not only when he is tried and convicted twice for the same offense
but also when one is charged and convicted for two offenses, one of which is a lesser included offense
of the other.").
In light of the court's recent decision in Gardner, however, the defendant may also lose his
double jeopardy protection in the greater and lesser included offense situation if the court determines
that the legislature intended multiple penalties. Gardner,315 N.C. at 455, 340 S.E.2d at 709.
102. 214 N.C. 107, 198 S.E. 613 (1938).
103. McGill, 296 N.C. at 568, 251 S.E.2d at 619.
104. Midgett, 214 N.C. at 110, 198 S.E. at 615 (quoting Dowdy v. State, 158 Tenn. 364, 13
S.W.2d 794 (1929)). The authority of Midgett in North Carolina can be questioned since it relied on
a Tennessee case for a portion of its analysis.
105. Hurst, 320 N.C. at 594-95, 359 S.E.2d at 779-80 (Frye, J., dissenting). The dissent placed
great emphasis on the number of takings while the majority stressed the number of incidents. The
dissent apparently ignored the idea that several takings can be part of a single incident. Multiple
takings does not necessarily mean multiple incidents.
106. Murray presented a very similar scenario. There, defendant first beat the victim and then
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or takings would be senseless if it depended on the skill of the prosecutor in

drafting the charge. The majority promulgated a more straightforward and less
trivial procedure: if the facts support legally separate and distinct crimes, multiple penalties are appropriate regardless of the number of transactions or the
similarity of the offenses.

The North Carolina Supreme Court was prudent in discarding the McGill
language, reaffirming that one transaction could support more than one similar
crime as long as the offenses were legally distinct, and deciding Hurst according

to the accurate interpretation of double jeopardy guarantees. Yet, this conclusion does not give the court of appeals or the dissent in Hurst enough credit.
The court of appeals, with which the dissent agreed, 10 7 placed primary emphasis
not on McGill, but on the Gardner approach and legislative intent.108 The ap-

pellate court did not broadly assert that one incident could never support two
similar crimes. The lower court was much more fact specific, and its study of
legislative intent, as in Gardner, was much more detailed. The court of appeals
simply argued that under the individual facts of this case, one taking from one

person at one time, the legislature did not intend to punish for crimes as similar
as armed robbery and felonious larceny.1 9 The majority never reached this result because it assumed that in cases of legally separate offenses, a detailed explo-

ration of legislative intent was unnecessary. Thus, the majority may still be
criticized for neglecting to thoroughly analyze the defendant's predicament.
This discussion will therefore proceed to the second issue: whether the Hurst
court should have followed the Gardner approach.

In single prosecution settings, the courts comply with double jeopardy
guarantees by imposing only the amount of punishment intended by the legislature. 110 Both Gardnerand Hurst complied with this requirement by comparing
the essential elements of the charged crimes to determine if the case consisted of

legally separate crimes.1"

When this comparison revealed that one crime was a

drove away in the victim's automobile with codefendants. Murray, 310 N.C. at 544, 313 S.E.2d at
526. If Murray can be interpreted to involve two separate events, then Hurst certainly can be interpreted to involve two incidents as well, if the prosecutor wanted to stretch his theory.
107. Hurst, 320 N.C. at 595-96, 359 S.E.2d at 780 (Frye, J., dissenting) (in his dissent, Justice
Frye referred to the court of appeals' opinion as "a well-reasoned and unanimous decision" which
Frye would affirm.).
108. The court of appeals devoted approximately nine pages to a discussion grounded in the
Gardnerapproach, Hurst, 82 N.C. App. at 10-19, 346 S.E.2d at 14-18, but devoted just over one
page to McGill. Id. at 19-20, 346 S.E.2d at 18-19. Thus, the court of appeals did not rely on McGill
as binding authority on double jeopardy doctrine. The appellate court argued that wholly apart
from a separate versus same offense analysis, the legislature did not intend to allow punishment for
crimes as similar as armed robbery and felonious larceny when the facts showed only a single taking
from one person at one time.
109. The court of appeals declared that defendant's right to be free from double jeopardy "was
violated by his punishment under two statutes which the legislature intended to be mutually exclusive under facts such as those in the case at bar." Hurst, 82 N.C. App. at 10, 346 S.E.2d at 14.
The dissent also claimed that the cases relied on by the majority "do not answer the question of
whether the legislature intended that a person should be punished for both felonious larceny and
armed robbery for a single taking from a single victim at one time.... mT1he legislature did not so
intend." Hurst, 320 N.C. at 595, 359 S.E.2d at 780 (Frye, J., dissenting).
110. See supra notes 74 & 98.
111. Gardner,315 N.C. at 454, 340 S.E.2d at 708-09; Hurst, 320 N.C. at 592, 359 S.E.2d at 778.
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lesser included offense of the other, the Gardner court only presumed that
double jeopardy prohibited multiple punishment.11 2 The court made the further

effort to carefully check the criminal statutes to see if this presumption could "be
rebutted by a clear indication of legislative intent." 113 In Hurst, on the other
hand, when this comparison revealed that each crime was separate and distinct,
the supreme court ended the inquiry and routinely assumed that the legislature
intended to impose multiple penalties. 114 The Hurst court failed to probe thoroughly legislative intent for an indication that the general assembly contemplated singular punishment even though the facts technically gave rise to
separate offenses. The court provided no clear reason for this dual approach.

The opinion simply stated that if felonious larceny was not a lesser included
offense of armed robbery, Gardner did not apply. 115
Perhaps Gardner should apply. The North Carolina Supreme Court has

apparently imposed a double standard: when one incident supports separate offenses, the State can automatically convict the defendant of both crimes with no
further inquiry; 116 but if the facts give rise to a greater offense and a lesser included offense, the court vigorously pursues legislative intent to see if multiple

punishment is nevertheless possible. 1 17 While advocates of strict criminal sentencing may applaud such a double standard, criminal defendants can rightfully

balk at the result. The supreme court gladly consults legislative intent in the
same offense setting in order to increase prison time; but when the case involves
separate offenses, the court is unwilling to delve into the statute to determine if
less punishment was intended. Not only does this dual approach seem unfair,

but it is inconsistent with previous North Carolina decisions.'18 It is also consis112. Gardner,315 N.C. at 455, 340 S.E.2d at 709.
113. Id.
114. Hurst, 320 N.C. at 591, 359 S.E.2d at 777 ("If a defendant is convicted of two crimes based
on the same incident and neither crime is a lesser included offense of the other, he may be sentenced

for both crimes.").
115. Id. at 591, 359 S.E.2d at 778.

116. Id.
117. Gardner,315 N.C. at 455, 340 S.E.2d at 709.
118. A fundamental concern is whether separate offenses are so different from greater and lesser
included offenses that they warrant a different analysis. Six years ago, the North Carolina Supreme
Court indicated that the treatment should be the same. In State v. Perry, 305 N.C. 225, 287 S.E.2d
810 (1982), after comparing the essential elements, the court held that larceny and possession of the
property stolen in the larceny were separate crimes. Id. at 231, 287 S.E.2d at 814. Though defendant could have been punished for both offenses, the court continued its inquiry. The Perry court
concluded that a "review of the legislative history and case law background against which [the]
possession statutes were enacted... [lead to the conclusion that] the Legislature did not intend to
punish an individual for larceny of property and the possession of the same property which he stole."
Id. at 235, 287 S.E.2d at 816.
The Hurst majority claimed that the Gardnermethod applied only in cases of greater and lesser
included offense. Yet, the Perry court in 1982 explored legislative intent even after an elements
comparison indicated legally distinct offenses. See also State v. Andrews, 306 N.C. 144, 148, 291
S.E.2d 581, 584 (even though larceny and possession were separate and distinct, the legislature did
not intend to punish an individual for both offenses; additional conviction vacated), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 946 (1982) State v. McCoy, 79 N.C. App. 273, 278, 339 S.E.2d 419, 423 (1986) (legislature did
not intend to punish defendant for both felonious larceny and felonious possession of stolen property); State v. Dow, 70 N.C. App. 82, 87, 318 S.E.2d 883, 887 (1984) (same); State v. Demott, 26
N.C. App. 14, 20, 214 S.E.2d 781, 785 (1975) (although defendant could have been convicted under
several sections of the prostitution statute, the legislature did not intend cumulative punishment).
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tent with the line of federal cases from which Gardner adopted the expanded
approach. 119

Unfortunately, the additional inquiry could become an empty gesture. As
in the past, the court could easily conclude that when the legislature deliberately
defined two offenses, it intended to impose two punishments. Yet, attention
should be paid to the court of appeals in Hurst.1 20 The appellate court avoided
the double standard and followed the expanded method by diligently exploring
legislative intent. The court found that "[t]he Gardnerfactors, as applied to the

case at bar, strongly suggest that the legislature did not intend to allow multiple
punishment under the circumstances of this case." 121 Since the supreme court
has committed itself to the pursuit of legislative intent as part of double jeopardy
doctrine, 122 it should avoid the double standard and be willing to either increase

or decrease punishment. The courts should thoroughly consult legislative intent
both in situations involving a greater and a lesser included
offense, and in situa12 3
tions involving legally separate and distinct offenses.

State v. Hurst can be praised for several reasons. It settled the conflict over
1 24 It
whether felonious larceny is a lesser included offense of armed robbery.
also reaffirmed a broad double jeopardy principle by holding that a single incident can give rise to more than one statutory offense, even if the crimes are of
the same nature.1 25 While these uncertainties were creatures of the supreme
119. The North Carolina Supreme Court borrowed the Gardnerapproach from a line of federal
cases culminating in Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983). See supranotes 72 & 73. In one case,
Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981), the United States Supreme Court found separate
offenses after applying the Blockburger test, but still searched legislative history for an indication
that the legislature intended only a single punishment. Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 339; see supra note 73.
Therefore, in adopting the federal approach, the North Carolina Supreme Court should realize that
the United States Supreme Court has surveyed legislative intent even in cases in which the comparison of essential elements showed separate offenses. For a discussion of the federal cases along with
suggestions for determining legislative intent, see Thomas, A Unified Theory ofMultiple Punishment,
47 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 1, 62-90 (1985).
It appears that prior to Hurst, neither the North Carolina nor the United States Supreme Court
recognized a difference between separate offense cases and same offense cases when exploring legislative intent.
120. State v. Hurst, 82 N.C. App. 1, 346 S.E.2d 8 (1986), rev'd, 320 N.C. 589, 359 S.E.2d 776

(1987).
121. Id. at 19, 346 S.E.2d at 18. Gardnerfactors refer to the methods of determining legislative
intent. One of the Gardnerfactors is the number of social norms violated. The court of appeals
found that both armed robbery and larceny violated the same norm, stealing another's property. A
second Gardnerfactor is legislative activity. Here, the court of appeals held that the legislature "did
not intend to change the well-established prohibition against punishment for both larceny and armed
robbery of the same property from a single victim." Id. at 14, 346 S.E.2d at 16. A third Gardner
factor is statutory placement. The court of appeals noted that both armed robbery and larceny were
listed in the same subchapter. Thus, the appellate court determined that the intent of the legislature
was to allow only a single punishment despite the existence of two distinct crimes. Id. at 19, 346
S.E.2d at 18.
122. Gardner,at 444, 340 S.E.2d at 707.
123. The purpose of this Note is not to question North Carolina's initial decision to abandon a
strict elements comparison and begin examining legislative intent. For a discussion of this issue, see
Note, supra note 74, at 1280-87. The point of this analysis is simply to show that if the court wishes
to probe legislative intent, it should do so in both of these situations.
124. The holding in Hurst was that felonious larceny and armed robbery are separate and distinct crimes. Hurst, 320 N.C. at 593, 359 S.E.2d at 778-79.
125. Id. at 591, 359 S.E.2d at 778.
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court's own inconsistency, 126 it was better to recognize and to decide the issues
than to leave them unresolved.
Yet, the majority in Hurst should be criticized for concentrating so heavily
on the McGill language. In its concern over the correct interpretation of a broad
double jeopardy principle,127 the court neglected to apply the entire double jeopardy approach. Unlike cases involving a greater and lesser included offense the
court did not attempt to pinpoint legislative intent. As a general proposition, it
is true that one incident can support two similar crimes, as long as the crimes are
legally distinct; but the court should still analyze specific separate offense cases
to determine if the general assembly contemplated only a single penalty. Using
legislative intent to inflict greater punishment while refusing to recognize legislative intent as a mitigating influence puts the criminal defendant in a "no win"
situation. This judicially imposed double standard should be eliminated.
Though consistent inquiry into the mindset of the general assembly may
impose a slight burden on the courts, the supreme court has already expressed
its willingness to carry that burden by its ruling in Gardner. After all, in the
area of multiple punishment for the same offense, the "intent of the Legislature
128
...is determinative."
If so, the North Carolina Supreme Court should not
intensely search for legislative intent in some cases while assuming it in others.
The additional burden of a consistent and complete inquiry would not be without benefits. Criminal sentencing would be more equitable because punishment
could be either increased or decreased. In addition, attorneys and lower courts
would have a more predictable methodology to guide them; they would know
that legislative history is a consideration and could plan their arguments
accordingly.
KEVIN QUIRK

126. See supra note 20 for opposing North Carolina cases.
127. This particular principle was whether, in the abstract, one incident could support punishment for two similar crimes.
128. Gardner, 315 N.C. at 452, 340 S.E.2d at 707 (quoting People v. Robideau, 419 Mich. 458,
355 N.W.2d 592, reh'g denied, 420 Mich. 1201, 362 N.W.2d 219 (1984)). The Gardnercourt stated
that defendant's only interest in single trial situations was in not having more punishment imposed
than the amount intended by the legislature. Therefore, legislative intent is paramount whenever
multiple punishment is a possibility. Id. at 452, 340 S.E.2d at 707; see supra note 74. It should
follow that legislative intent is paramount and should be thoroughly consulted in all single trial
situations where multiple punishment is a possibility, whether the single trial involves separate offenses or a greater and lesser included offense.

